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‘But what happens now,’ he said gently, ‘where I go now …’ Bill was still looking so seriously at him. She was on the edge of tears. ‘It has to be alone.’

— Doctor Who by Paul Cornell (92%)

Nothing actually was better, probably. No-one was doing anything with a magic wand.

But the fleet had got away. Compared to that, everything else was ... well, not easy. But less like a wall and more like steps.

You might never win, but at least you could try. If not you, who else?

— Only You Can Save Mankind by Terry Pratchett (Page 172)

The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation, reason, desire.

Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.

The origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying

For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things thathave once been done.)

The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.

— The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: The Florentine/Cantica III by Dante Alighieri

“Sporos, all farandolae are royal. All singers of the song are princes.” “Nonsense. In Name only.” “The Name matters.” “Only to matter.” Proginoskes’s kything was so gentle that it undercut the storm of Echthroi. “You are created matter, Sporos. You are part of the great plan, an indispensable part. You are needed, Sporos; you have your own unique share in the freedom of creation.” “Do not listen to that hideous cherubim. He’s nothing but a deformed emanation of energy. We will give you no name and you will have power.”

— A Wind in the Door by Madeleine L'Engle (90%)

“When Sporos Deepens,” Proginoskes told Mr. Jenkins, “it means that he comes of age. It means that he grows up. The temptation for farandola or for man or for star is to stay an immature pleasure-seeker. When we seek our own pleasure as the ultimate good we place ourselves as the center of the universe. A fara or a man or a star has his place in the universe, but nothing created is the center.”

— A Wind in the Door by Madeleine L'Engle (83%)

“When I was memorizing the names of the stars, part of the purpose was to help them each to be more particularly the particular star each one was supposed to be. That’s basically a Namer’s job. Maybe you’re supposed to make earthlings feel more human.”

[...]

“I think your mythology would call them fallen angels. War and hate are their business, and one of their chief weapons is un-Naming—making people not know who they are. If someone knows who he is, really knows, then he doesn’t need to hate. That’s why we still need Namers, because there are places throughout the universe like your planet Earth. When everyone is really and truly Named, then the Echthroi will be vanquished.” “But what—” “Oh, earthling, earthling, why do you think Blajeny called for you? There is war in heaven, and we need all the help we can get. The Echthroi are spreading through the universe. Every time a star goes out another Echthros has won a battle. A star or a child or a farandola—size doesn’t matter, Meg. The Echthroi are after Charles Wallace and the balance of the entire universe can be altered by the outcome.” “But Progo, what does this have to do with our test—and with three Mr. Jenkinses—it’s insane.” Proginoskes responded coldly and quietly. “Precisely.” Into the cold and quiet came the sound of the school buses arriving, doors opening, children rushing out and into the school building. Charles Wallace was one of those children. Proginoskes moved quietly in her mind through the roar. “Don’t misunderstand me, Meg. It is the ways of the Echthroi which are insane. The ways of the Teachers are often strange, but they are never haphazard. I know that Mr. Jenkins has to have something to do with it, something important, or we wouldn’t be here.” Meg said, unhappily, “If I hate Mr. Jenkins whenever I think of him, am I Naming him?” Proginoskes shifted his wings. “You’re Xing him, just like the Echthroi.” “Progo!” “Meg, when people don’t know who they are, they are open either to being Xed, or Named.”

[...]

“But how do I do it? How do I Name Mr. Jenkins when all I think of when I see him is how awful he is?” Proginoskes sighed and flung several wings heavenwards so violently that he lifted several feet, materialized, and came down with a thud. “There’s a word—but if I say it you’ll just misunderstand.” “You have to say it.” “It’s a four-letter word. Aren’t four-letter words considered the bad ones on your planet?” “Come on. I’ve seen all the four-letter words on the walls of the washroom at school.” Proginoskes let out a small puff. “Luff.” “What?” “Love. That’s what makes persons know who they are. You’re full of love, Meg, but you don’t know how to stay within it when it’s not easy.” “What do you mean?” “Oh—you love your family. That’s easy. Sometimes when you feel awful about somebody, you get back into rightness by thinking about—well, you seem to be telling me that you got back into love once by thinking about Charles Wallace."

— A Wind in the Door by Madeleine L'Engle (37%)

‘[T]he good that intellect desires to win’ is a phrase much influenced – as is so much of Dante’s thinking – by Aristotle’s Ethics. Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics 6: 2: 1139 a:

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore must the reasoning be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical. But of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and bad state are truth and falsity respectively…The origin of action…is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end.

— The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: The Florentine/Cantica III by Dante Alighieri